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1. Introduction 
Every century has had its old and new fears and the eighteenth century is no 
exception. If we take a rapid look at the pages that Jean Delumeau (Delumeau 
1978) devoted to the eighteenth century in his classic work on fear, or if we browse 
La peur dans l’histoire (Palou 1958) or La peur au xviiième siècle (Berchtold - Porret 
1994) we find a list of fears that will not surprise us at all. Diseases, plagues, and 
punishments still constituted in Voltaire’s century a significant part of the 
reflections of intellectuals as well as common people’s worries and experiences. 
Moreover, as regards fear, the eighteenth century had also its maître à penser: 
Montesquieu, who considered fear the dynamic principle of despotism, a category 
he used as a polemical weapon against absolutism (Robin 2000; Shklar 1989).  
The age of Enlightenment as a period of profound cultural, social and political 
transformations was a period of great hopes (Baczko 1979) but also of great fears 
(Masseau 2000; McMahon 2001). However, the obvious question is this: what about 
the French Revolution? Was it a turning point in this regard? The answer is: no, it 
was not; and yes, it was. On one hand, it was not, because what indeed the Great 
Fear of 1789 tells us is that the beginning of the Revolution was marked by the re-
emergence of traditional fears, of the same ancestral fears that accompanied 
human history: above all the fear of starvation and famine (Lefebvre 1932). On the 
other hand, everything changed with the French Revolution even the universe of 
fear: as Michel Vovelle wrote, “the French Revolution marks a decisive turning 
point in the history of fear” (Vovelle 1987: 67) from long-standing fears to new 
ones. 
Hope and fear were the fundamental features of the revolutionary mentality, 
which was continuously preoccupied with the fear of internal conspiracy, 
aristocratic conspiracy, foreign invasion, etc. (Burstin 2016); while the alternation 
of fears and hopes characterized the daily experience of that variegated world 
which actively opposed the Revolution or passively lived on its margins (Cobb 1990; 
Sutherland 2000). Furthermore, the Terror – replacing spontaneous violence with 
organized repression – erected what André Chénier eloquently called the “autels de 
la peur” (Chénier 1984). In short, the massive presence of the sense of fear 
characterized all the revolutionary years. This is well illustrated by the 
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extraordinary rich iconography produced by the French Revolution, where the 
number of images of fear under the Revolution are countless (Vovelle 1988), and by 
historiography. In fact, the latter has deeply investigated this research field, analysing it 
in its various forms (fear, panic, terror, violence) and from different disciplinary 
perspectives (history of mentality, political anthropology, etc. (Vovelle 2014: 231-
246)).  
Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to argue that the French Revolution not 
only influenced the history of modern fears but also and deeply influenced the 
history of European fears as such. It contends that the French Revolution 
incidentally created the concept itself of European fear because it prompted the 
counter-revolutionaries to conceive Europe as the first victim of the French 
Revolution. In this sense, around the counter-revolutionary discourse on Europe 
there consolidated the fears provoked by the endangering of the religious, 
political, social and cultural structure typical of the ancien régime. 
In the next three sections, my discussion is organised as follows: the first 
section deals with the fears expressed by counter-revolutionary thinkers in relation 
to Europe’s fate. It points out the transformation undergone by the discourse on 
Europe in response to the emergence of the discourse on Nation (Chabod 2015: 82-
121). The second section investigates counter-revolutionary critical analysis of the 
doctrines that had led Europe to the brink of disaster. The third section focuses on 
counter-revolutionary historiographical invention of the myth of Christian medieval 
Europe as a balanced order characterized by peace, spiritual harmony, and strong 
social cohesion: a nostalgic myth the origin of which is attributable to the 
controversy concerning the French Revolution. The Europe of the counter-
revolutionaries assumed the characteristics of a “desperate remedy” (Febvre 2014: 
260) in which to seek shelter from the revolutionary fears which threatened to 
destroy Europe and its values. The outcome was the creation of a myth designed 
and conceived for use by counter-revolutionary concerns and struggles, a nostalgic 
myth with a powerful attractive force.  
 
 
2. Towards the dissolution of Europe 
The French Revolution was conceived by counter-revolutionary thinkers as a 
true “European wound” possibly degenerating into the dissolution of Europe. As 
Louis de Bonald’s words made clear, “today […] it is the Christian religion that 
must be defended, it is the civilization of Europe and of the world that must be 
preserved” (Bonald 1806: 240). Joseph de Maistre declared in turn, “Before leaving 
for Turin I burnt the manuscript of my Lettres savoisiennes that I wrote at the time 
when I didn’t have the least illumination on the French Revolution or, perhaps I 
should say, on the European Revolution”. Two decades later, Louis de Bonald 
reiterated, “The French Revolution or, rather, the European revolution, was a call 
to all the passions and faults; to use the force of a geometric expression, it was 
evil at its maximum strength”.  
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As observed by Martyn P. Thompson (Thompson 1994: 38), the “European 
moment” began with the French Revolution, which gave rise to a heated debate on 
Europe led by counter-revolutionary thinkers. In fact, in the opinion of the latter 
the French Revolution was a European revolution, not simply because of its 
extensive impact but also because of its political objectives. The outbreak of the 
French Revolution radically changed the notion of Europe. In a few years 
Montesquieu’s Europe, “a term midway between ‘fatherland’ and ‘humankind” 
(Febvre 2014: 200; Delpiano 2017: 19-34) was overshadowed by the emergence of 
the nation. Voltaire’s Europe, the ideal country of cultured and refined people, 
was silenced by the cries of nation to which the revolution, assigned an absolutely 
new political value (Nora 1994: 899-911; Tuccari 2000). For the revolutionaries, 
Europe became a threat, a controversial target against which to take up arms. In 
the revolutionaries’ eyes, it was “the kings’ Europe, the hostile Europe of which 
the emigrants on the one hand, and the king and queen of France on the other, 
tried to mobilize the armies against the Revolution” (Febvre 2014: 220). 
It is precisely the perception of being subject to aggression of pan-European 
extent, shared by all counter-revolutionary thought that explains why Joseph de 
Maistre - one of the leading voices of the counter-revolution - in Considérations sur 
la France (1797) tackled the subject of the destructive power of the Revolution 
and, highlighted its dangerous consequences for Europe (Maistre 1994: 4-9). The 
idea that Europe was in unprecedented danger had become part of counter-
revolutionary arguments - whose networks, thanks to emigration, extended 
throughout Europe (Godechot 1988: 149 et seq.) - since Edmund Burke had 
declared in 1790 that “it looks to me as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs 
of France alone, but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe” (Burke 1986: 92; 
Furet 1986). In the Reflections on the Revolutions in France - a work that the 
radical intellectual James Mackintosh scornfully called the “manifesto of the 
Counter-revolution” (MacKintosh 1995: 274) - Burke claimed that the Europe upheld 
by “knightly virtue and Christian faith”, which for centuries had been at the head 
of the process of civilization, risked being lost forever. Burke’s ideas and 
preoccupations were echoed in the main counter-revolutionary works: so, for 
instance, Jacques Mallet du Pan, Swiss by birth but French by adoption, stated in 
1793 that whatever happens in France “Europe cannot long bear without being 
infected” (Mallet du Pan 1793: 3). From the outset, the final goal of the French 
Revolution had been - in his opinion - “the subversion of the social order 
throughout Europe” (Mallet du Pan 1793: 12). What the Revolution was staging in 
the counter-revolutionary’s opinion was the drama of the disintegration of Europe. 
The sacrilegious acts performed by the Revolution meant to a certain extent also 
the end of Europe. The idea of rethinking the European political profile on the 
basis of national self-determination seemed pure folly: such a notion embodied the 
very essence of modernity, centred on the desire to break away from the authority 
of God and tradition. From the French Revolution onwards, Europe had followed a 
road that was leading to suicide: for this reason, Maistre wrote in 1819 with an 
emphasis as tragic as it was sarcastic, “je meurs avec l’Europe, je suis en bonne 
compagnie” (Maistre 1979-1980: t XIV, p. 183). 
The counter-revolutionary discourse, imbued with fears and the inventor of a 
well-defined style, that of "vitupération", did not limit itself to condemning the 
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revolutionary "cataclysme" (J.-P. Bertaud 2013: 101-121), conceived as an 
expression of divine wrath; it also sought to determine the long-term causes of the 
Revolution. In this endeavour to explain the unprecedented, the diagnosis of 
counter-revolutionary thought was unanimous: the combined attack of 
Protestantism and of the Enlightenment doctrines had jeopardized the fate of 
Europe.  
 
 
3. The great enemies of Europe: the mortal doctrines behind the Revolution 
According to the counter-revolutionaries, Europe’s mortal wounds had not 
been inflicted only by the Revolution, but also by the Enlightenment and the false 
doctrines that had silently eroded the laws, customs and institutions that made up 
its time-honoured foundation (Gengembre 1989). Europe, Bonald wrote, “cannot 
perish except by wasting away. The day when the atheistic dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people replaces in politics the sacred dogma of the sovereignty 
of God; the day when Europe ceases to be Christian and monarchical, she will 
perish, and the sceptre of the world will pass to other hands” (Bonald 1815: 22).  
The legacy of the pernicious doctrines that had undermined Europe and its 
monarchies could be traced back to the limitless trust of the philosophes and 
revolutionaries in the capacity of human reason, a confidence inculcated initially 
by Protestantism. There was a direct connection among Protestantism, the 
Enlightenment and the Revolution. In the ranks of the blameworthy, a special place 
was reserved for Protestantism because it had inoculated Europe with the virus of 
discussion, the challenge made by individual reason to God and tradition. Among 
the counter-revolutionary thinkers, Maistre was indubitably the author who most 
emphasized this point. In Du Pape, he wrote that in order to stem the impending 
misfortunes it was necessary to “remove from the European dictionary this 
menacing word, PROTESTANTISM” (Maistre 1819: 524). In the essay Sur le 
protestantisme, written in 1798, Maistre insisted that Protestantism was the “great 
enemy of Europe” (Maistre 1798: 64). By dint of attacking and corroding 
everything, Protestantism had undermined the principle of sovereignty and faith in 
God, placing Europe on a slippery and insecure slope, as slippery and insecure as 
anything that did not come from the hands of God. 
Enlightenment principles had amplified and broadened the senseless 
revaluation of individual reason advocated by Protestantism. Even Chateaubriand, 
at the time one of the "most liberal" thinkers belonging to the counter-
revolutionary movement, did not spare criticism of the Enlightenment. In his Essai 
historique, politique et moral sur les revolutions anciennes et modernes, 
considérées dans leur rapports avec la Révolution Française (1797) he wrote that 
the principles of the philosophes “have become the machines that demolished the 
edifice of the current governments of Europe” (Chateaubriand 1978: 369) The 
Enlightenment, blamed for having promoted a form of reason capable only of 
destruction, was accused of having ignored the nihilistic power of Enlightenment 
reason: “What, therefore, was the spirit of this sect [the Encyclopaedists]? 
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Destruction. To destroy was their aim; destroying their argument. What did they 
want to put in the place of what was already there? Nothing” (Chateaubriand 1978: 
359).  
Human institutions displayed all their inadequacy when they claimed to 
replace tradition and authority with rational inquiry. On the contrary, as Maistre 
wrote with reference to the “miracle” of the Church, “No human institution has 
lasted eighteen centuries. This achievement, which would be surprising anywhere, 
is even more surprising in the bosom of noble Europe. Idleness is anathema to the 
European and his character contrasts sharply with the immobility of the Oriental. 
For the European it is necessary to act, to strive, to innovate and change 
everything possible” (Maistre 1819: 431). In its diagnosis of the long-term causes of 
the European crisis, counter-revolutionary discourse deemed Europe to be the 
victim of the process of pluralization and secularization: outside France, Novalis’ 
famous fragment of 1799, Christianity or Europe, insisted precisely on this aspect 
(Novalis 2002; Verga 2017: 36-37).  
In contrast to this Europe, wounded and pursuing the path of decadence, 
counter-revolutionary discourse proposed another: that of Christian-medieval 
Europe. In opposition to the Europe of the people and nations, and against the 
society envisioned by the Revolutionaries and built on abstract notions of human 
rights, freedom, equality and fraternity, counter-revolutionary discourse proposed 
the tangible society of the past, built on the solid ground of history, authority, 
tradition and religion. Within this clash, which turned history into a polemical 
discipline, was born the myth of medieval Europe. 
 
 
4. A lament for Europe 
As shown by Carolina Armenteros, in the age of the Revolution medievalism 
acquired a specific political significance, allowing supporters of the monarchy to 
disguise their enthusiasm for the restoration of the throne (which in fact dated 
from the Middle Ages) as erudite investigations, without exposing themselves to the 
risk of violent attack (Armenteros 2014: 20-47). Furthermore, medievalism—like 
much of the rhetorical arsenal of the counter-revolution—found, for opposition, its 
raison d’être in the Enlightenment attitude towards the Middle Ages. It is now well 
known that the verdict of the Enlightenment on the Middle Ages was far from 
unique. Two things, however, cannot be ignored. First, the cliché that the 
philosophes built around the eighteenth century: that of the siècle des Lumières, 
illuminated by the light of reason and in polemical opposition to the dark centuries 
of the Middle Ages, living in the shadow of prejudice. Second, the judgment on the 
medieval period expressed by Voltaire, whose mortal remains were transferred to 
the Panthéon in 1791 with the most imposing of ceremonies. For him, the Middle 
Ages symbolized dogmatism, fanaticism, intolerance (Montoya 2013).  
It is reasonable to argue that the anti-medievalism of Voltaire and the 
Revolutionaries prompted the counter-revolutionaries to explore the argumentative 
potential of recalling a medieval Europe, described with lament and nostalgia for 
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something lost. Such an argument was in fact a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, it brought with it the obvious reference to a historical period before the 
rupture of the Reform, a period imbued with Christian religious sentiments in 
which the power of the pope and the Church was at its zenith. An age consequently 
presented in counter-revolutionary discourses as the highest point of European 
civilization. On the other hand, the evocation of the Middle Ages as a golden age of 
European society went hand in hand with a severe verdict on modernity, which far 
from being a path of progress, equated to gradual degeneration. The counter-
revolutionary Middle Ages were intended to be anti-modern, since the Protestant 
reform, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were conceived as 
embodiments of modernity. 
Thus, for example, Bonald identified Charlemagne, Christianity, the papacy, 
the Crusades and the nobility as the drivers of a process of European civilization 
that was led by France (Bonald 1800: 113), while Maistre argued, “there will come 
a time in which the popes that we have recriminated against, like Gregory VII, will 
be considered in all countries as the friends, the tutors, the saviours of the human 
race, as the true founding geniuses of Europe” (Maistre 1814: 261). Behind the 
discourse on medieval Europe lay three themes that were typically counter-
revolutionary. The first was the desire to restore the centrality of God, which 
impelled the counter-revolutionary thinkers to insist on religion as the 
indispensable source of legitimacy of socio-political institutions and as the 
guarantee of their lasting duration. The second was the counter-revolutionary 
concerns about the dissolution of social ties, the decline of social hierarchies and 
the birth of that entirely modern “passion” which was individualism. Consequently, 
what Reedy wrote about Bonald must be considered true for most of the counter-
revolutionary thinkers: their “medievalism —a highly selective, even fantastic, 
interpretation of the civilization of the Middle Ages—functions as the obverse of the 
modern individualism they reviled” (Reedy 1995: 53; Pranchère). The third was a 
new kind of historical attitude generated by the excesses of the Revolution, which 
railed against the historical ruins that symbolized Catholic France and the ancien 
régime. This led the counter-revolutionaries, generally favourable to the early 
stages of the Revolution, to look backwards, to resort to the worship of ruins and of 
the past, thus leaning towards the veneration of the monarchy and the martyred 
king (Gengembre 1989: 234-238). In this respect, the Génie du Christianisme 
probably offered the most influential representation of a medieval Europe 
identified with Christianitas, marked by order and harmony that nurtured unity of 
thought and belief. The book, written by Chateaubriand in 1802, was designed as a 
refutation of Enlightenment doctrines and it was a resounding success. Its aim was 
to show that, in opposition to the monstrous campaign waged by the 
Enlightenment, Christianity had played an extraordinary role as a civilizing force, 
from its first appearance and throughout the subsequent centuries. The Génie du 
Christianisme painted a picture of a mythologized Middle Ages, described as the 
laboratory of freedom, an image barely credible from a historical point of view, 
but one that worked polemically in reference to a lost past devoured by the 
Revolution. 
Last but not least, medieval Europe, in the counter-revolutionary account, 
was a continent that had over time rid itself of the propensity for violence and 
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conquest: it was a peaceful Europe depicted in open contrast to the bloodiest days 
of the Revolution and the years of the Napoleonic wars. Bonald wrote, “Europe 
until the sixteenth century lived by these two principles of monarchy and 
Christianity. Peace was interrupted by wars between neighbours. But such wars 
without hate, these passing struggles between two peoples united by the same 
political and religious doctrines had only served as an outlet for the forces of 
states, without any danger to their power and independence” (Bonald 1815). 
Being forced to stand on enemy ground and to confront the issues and 
language of the Revolution, counter-revolutionary thought organized its discourse 
in reaction to its adversary. Its vocabulary, arguments and polemics were dictated 
by the agenda of the Revolution. When the Revolution invoked the language of the 
rights of man, the counter-revolution invoked those of duties. When the Revolution 
fought in the name of the nation, the counter-revolution fought in the name of 
Europe. In the age in which the problematic relationship between Europe and its 
constituent nations arose, Europe became a weapon in the rhetorical arsenal of the 
counter-revolution, if “nation” was le mot de la Révolution, “Europe” was the 
rallying cry of the counter-revolution. In the polemics of those crucial years, 
Europe thus appeared as a discourse against the very idea of Revolution and against 
a certain idea of mankind, of history and of man’s role in history. The Europe of 
the counter-revolutionaries had its roots in the ground abandoned by their foes: 
history, religion, tradition.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Congress of Vienna gave rise to a political and diplomatic system whose 
importance for the history of Europe is unquestionable. Indeed, however one 
interprets the Restoration, it is impossible to deny its significance as a turning 
point in the construction of modern Europe. However, in counter-revolutionary 
opinion, the Revolution, far from ending in 1815, from being buried under the 
principles of balance and legitimacy, had also triumphed at the Congress of Vienna. 
The Holy Alliance, in the Preamble drafted by Tsar Alexander I, denounced the 
clear desire to found the Concert of Europe on the basis of religious indifference: 
the union of Christian sovereigns in Europe virtually affirmed equality between its 
different churches. Despite its name, the Holy Alliance appeared to the counter-
revolutionaries to be the heir of Bayle, Voltaire and religious indifferentism. The 
idea of restoring the centrality of God, religion and church seemed lost forever. 
While on the other hand, the importance acquired by nations and nationalities 
seemed definitively to compromise the idea of a peaceful, civilized, powerful 
Europe. For this reason, counter-revolutionaries continued to view Europe’s 
prospects with pessimism. As Antoine Compagnon wrote, counter-revolutionaries, 
“untimely and outdated, pessimistic and sceptical, now appear, with their 
disenchantment” - and I add with their fears for Europe - “to be our real 
contemporaries”. 
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